🧐 Galvenā tēze to cilvēku vidū, kas atbalsta priekšlaicīgu otrā pensiju līmeņa uzkrājuma izņemšanu, ir, ka "tā ir cilvēku, nevis valsts nauda". apollo.lv/8494402/faktomats-… #SIF_MAF2026

Zviedrijas regulators aicina Eiropas Savienību pagaidām neatļaut “Tesla Full Self-Drive” lietošanu kursors.lv/2026/06/21/zviedr…

Nu tik ļooooooti ģenerālprokuroram Meisteram gribas šeit ieviest otru Krieviju vai Lielbritāniju, aizbāzt mutes un sabāzt cietumos visus tos, kuri nevēlas samierināties ar to, ko viņa suga, mentu zaņķis, Vienotības vēzis, sarkanā sērga un kolaboracionistu vara vēlas izdarīt ar Latviju un latviešiem. Nesanāks, mūdzi, nesanāks.

Interesanti, ka šī intervija ir pazudusi no jauns.lv un zem attiecīgās birkas nav atrodama. Ja tie tiešām ir ģenerālprokurora izteikumi, tad viņš ir otro reizi mēneša laikā parādījis, ka nav amatam piemērots. jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/714953… jauns.lv/tema/armins-meister…

It seems to me the popular framing around this $300bn reconstruction fund being akin to reparations is all wrong. As far as I can see it’s a private investment vehicle, funded by a consortium of international private sector companies and investors that need legal certainty and stability to act. And guarantees that they will not be at risk of being sanctioned themselves. That makes it more like a bailout of Iran’s collapsing economy by external capital (based on a bunch of conditionality) than a “reparation” fund. Fascinatingly, at $300bn the deal represents FDI several times larger than all foreign direct investment Iran has received since 1979 combined! The most striking thing about the reporting of this so far is how little has leaked regarding governance, ownership rights, equity percentages, or investor protections. The headlines focus on the size of the fund, but the structure remains largely opaque. And this arguably is the most important element of the deal. Without this info I wouldn’t be too quick to proclaim wins or losses. If the deal secures 50:50 ownership of capital invested in (rather than majority share for Iran) this would be a significant capitulation of control by Iran. And a MAJOR shift in economic norms for the country. Worth remembering modern Iranian nationalism was formed around the belief that foreign powers repeatedly extracted Iran’s wealth while leaving Iran with little control. Since 1979, Iran has consistently structured its economy to ensure that foreign capital could enter only on terms that preserved ultimate Iranian ownership and control. Throughout the period it has nationalized major industries and banks, embedded state control of strategic sectors such as oil, gas, minerals, banking, foreign trade and infrastructure in the constitution, prohibited foreign ownership of hydrocarbon reserves, rejected concession agreements and MOST IMPORTANTLY production-sharing arrangements common elsewhere. It has relied instead on tightly controlled buyback and service contracts that required foreign investors to finance and develop projects before handing them back to the state. Even when it later liberalized through investment laws and newer petroleum contracts, it generally insisted that foreign firms remain contractors or minority partners rather than owners of strategic assets. The underlying objective throughout was to prevent any recurrence of the foreign economic influence associated in Iranian political memory with the pre-revolution oil concessions, the 1953 coup, and decades of perceived external control over national resources. If the reported $300 billion vehicle ends up being structured around genuine equity participation and shared ownership rather than Iran’s traditional contractor-style arrangements, it would represent a major departure from the economic model Iran has largely followed since 1979.

France reportedly chose a Latvian drone-killer called BLAZE to protect its forces — after beating out competitors in a rigorous French military evaluation. First units arrive within weeks. France will also build them locally. defence-blog.com/france-buys…