PRO un LPV vienojas krievu valodas aizstāvībai.

Krievijas pilsoņi, tostarp tie, kuri ir piedalījušies karā pret Ukrainu rada drošības riskus visai Eiropai. ◾️Pieprasīju atsevišķām ES valstīm izbeigt praksi nodrošināt vīzu izsniegšanu Krievijas un Baltkrievijas pilsoņiem. ◾️Latvija pievienosies Igaunijas iniciatīvai. Mēs Šengenas zonas "melnajā sarakstā" iekļausim daudzus Krievijas kaujiniekus, kuri ir piedalījušies karā pret Ukrainu. Pieprasām ES rīkoties un iekļaut "melnajā sarakstā" visus agresorvalsts kaujiniekus. Migranti, kuri ar Baltkrievijas varasiestāžu atbalstu cenšas nelegāli šķērsot Latvijas, Lietuvas un Polijas robežas. ◾️Individuālā sarunā ar Migrācijas komisāram norādīju, ka man neapmierina iepriekš novērotā pasivitāte - mums vajag ES līmeņa likumdošanas izmaiņas, kas ļaus efektīvāk cīnīties pret hibrīddraudiem uz mūsu robežām. Komisārs apstiprināja, ka ņems vērā Latvijas prasību pēc ES likumdošanas sakārtošanas. ◾️Aicināju ES korekti atspoguļot imigrācijas spiedienu uz mūsu robežām, ņemot vērā arī novērstos ieceļošanas gadījumus. ES ārējās robežas valstis ir jānodrošina ar atbalstu infrastruktūras un personāla stiprināšanai.

Izspēlējam domu eksperimentu. 1. solis. Krievija tālāk iebrūk Moldovā (nav ES, nav NATO); 2. solis. Krievija paralēli sagrābj Maltu (ir ES, nav NATO); 3. solis. Krievija tālāk iebrūk Rumānijā (ir ES, ir NATO). 4. solis. Krievija tālāk iebrūk Lietuvā (ir ES, ir NATO, ir kaimiņvalsts). Vai un pēc kura soļa, jūsuprāt, Latvijas farmācijas uzņēmumiem derētu beigt tirgot medikamentus Krievijai?

"It's very important not to politicise a personal tragedy."

"Vincent Munster and Claude Kwe, both researchers with the NIH at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory were charged today in a criminal complaint with conspiracy to smuggle monkeypox into the US and giving false statements to federal law enforcement" justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/fed…

Congratulations to Zimbabwe on being elected for a two-year term on the U.N. Security Council. Zimbabwe's credentials: 🇿🇼 Torture 🇿🇼 Child labor 🇿🇼 Tainted elections 🇿🇼 Jails critics and journalists 🇿🇼 Authoritarian rule over decades

This is what “drone air superiority” looks like.⬇️ So many AFU drones have been fired above the rate of 🇷🇺defense missile and AA-gun production that they get a free ride to any strategic bombing target.

Absolute drama for them. Dry dock means zero watertight integrity which in turn usually means even your X Ray hatches will be open. Air pipes through passageways blocking hatches. Possibly no fire main available. And a real danger in using excessive water to fight the fire /1

Vēl vairāk tas attiecas uz latviešiem — mūsu ir vēl aptuveni simtkārt mazāk nekā japāņu.

"Saziņa krieviski ar cilvēkiem Latvijā, kuri spēj runāt latviski, mūs tuvina krievu pasaulei un tās iecerei reanimēt zudušo impēriju." latvijasdrosiba.lv/post/risi…

Esmu tik vecs, ka atceros kā 2012. gadā premjers Dombrovskis brauca uz Arābu emirātiem prezentēt airBaltic biznesa plānu, un runāt par iespējamu AAE un Kataras aviosabiedrību kā stratēģisko investoru piesaisti.

Since the 1980s, the Sahara has shrunk by roughly 8%. Satellite data show widespread greening, a pattern that is playing out across the planet. Around 50% of Earth's vegetated land has become significantly greener, an area roughly three times the size of the United States. The dominant driver is not rainfall or land use change, it is rising atmospheric CO2. Higher CO2 lets plants photosynthesize more efficiently, they lose less water, they tolerate heat and dryness better. The effect is strongest along desert margins, across the Sahel, the Middle East, Australia's interior and the southern edge of the Sahara. Rising CO2 is making the deserts, and the planet as a whole, greener.

Russia Uses Religion in the Same Way as the Islamic State The Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Halych presented his book “Chronicle of a Sacrilegious War” in Madrid. @JPLindsley underfirenews.substack.com/p…

Migrācijas polītika arī pašnāvnieciska.

The Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum of 2026 (SPIEF 2026) in Russia has started with a very fiery keynote speech by the Ukrainian surprise guests.

Reporting from the Financial Times on Xinjiang remains incredibly grim: * In some areas, 90% of children are taken from parents to be educated in boarding schools where they aren't allowed to speak Uyghur * Officials monitor who eats during Ramadan and report those who skip meals * Basic items like prayer mats and religious text are considered illegal contraband * Adult Uyghur women are pressured to marry Han Chinese men, and there are official goals to sterilize a certain % of them. * Xinjiang has the largest prison capacity in the world relative to population * Huge numbers of Uyghur prisoners are now being shipped across the country in forced labor schemes, as a way to dodge Xinjiang sanctions/boycotts * The CCP shut down all 10 existing Uyghur-language publishers, none remain. They fed one university's book collection into a shredder. There's a lot going on the world, but it's worth remembering that China is still actively engaged in cultural genocide. They're barely even hiding it, they openly talk about the need to 'correct' Uyghur culture and create 'ethnic unity'. They are openly destroying an entire culture as efficiently as they can, cutting children off from parents, restricting language, restricting religious practice, forcing sterilizations and intermarriage, imprisoning anyone who resists the tiniest amount and shipping them out to forced labor factories. That is what the CCP is. ft.com/content/119d8c3a-e10f…

Die Ukrainer haben geflügelte Quadcopter-FPVs entwickelt. Die Russen werden sie vermutlich binnen Wochen kopieren, wonach funkgesteuerte FPVs bis 100 km Reichweite haben können. Das ist so ein gutes Beispiel, warum überhastete Großbestellungen von FPV durch NATO-Staaten aktuell kompletter Unsinn sind. Weil der heutige technische Stand binnen Monaten überholt und binnen eines Jahres nicht mehr zu gebrauchen ist. Die einzige Chance, Schritt zu halten, besteht darin, die Produktion hochzufahren und die Ukraine zu beliefern. Dort gibt es unmittelbares Einsatzfeedback und laufende Entwicklungsimpulse aus der Praxis. Die so hochgefahrene Produktionskapazität kann später jederzeit für die eigenen Streitkräfte genutzt werden – bis dahin unterstützt sie die Ukraine.

you can be a pro russian fan all you want. but math is math. one of the chapters in my next book..... THE SCOREBOARD Then. Now. Where the Math Goes. When I looked at the Russian force assembling along Ukraine's borders in early 2022, I ran the same mental math I had run hundreds of times against Soviet orders of battle in the 1980s. Formation by formation. Capability by capability. I was looking at the best Russia had. Everything they could field was about to cross the border. I had one question. Not whether Russia was stronger on paper. It obviously was. My question was whether Ukraine would fold. Because if they did not fold, none of those Russian numbers mattered the way the television analysts thought they did. FEBRUARY 24, 2022 — THE HIGH-WATER MARK RUSSIA — February 24, 2022 CategoryNumbersNotes Troops deployed~190,000Four groupings: north toward Kyiv, northeast toward Kharkiv, east in Donbas, south from Crimea. Every significant professional unit Russia had. Nothing held in reserve. This was the entire bet. Reserve capacity~500,000Partially trained. Mobilisation not yet declared. Russia assumed it would not be needed. They brought riot shields and dress uniforms instead. Tanks — frontline~1,200T-72B3/B3M, T-80BVM, T-90M leading. Professional crews who knew their vehicles. This was the last time Russia would field crews like this. Tanks — in storage~7,300Appeared inexhaustible. Ranging from T-55 to T-90. What no one outside intelligence circles fully understood was how much of it was theft, rust, and paperwork. IFVs / APCs — working~1,500 frontlineBMP-2, BMP-3, BTR-82A. Coherent combined-arms units. Functioning. Crews trained on doctrine. IFVs / APCs — storage~7,700 BMP-classAppeared as a vast reserve. Much of it was not. Artillery deployed~1,8002S19, 2S3, 2S7. Well-stocked. Coordinated fires doctrine understood if not always executed. Artillery in storage~23,600Towed and self-propelled combined. Looked inexhaustible. Fixed-wing combat aircraft~700+Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35S, Su-24M. Modern. Capable. Well-maintained. Combat helicopters~500+Ka-52, Mi-28N, Mi-24/35. Experienced crews. BTGs in theatre~66Battalion Tactical Groups — the doctrinal unit Russia bet everything on. Works if the enemy runs. Troop qualityProfessionalContract soldiers. NCOs present if inconsistent. Syria and Chechnya veterans in key positions. MoraleHigh — brieflyThey were told seventy-two hours. Some brought parade uniforms. They genuinely believed it. UKRAINE — February 24, 2022 CategoryNumbersNotes Active military~196,000Eight years of rebuilding after 2014. Donbas veterans in frontline units. Not the army of 2014. Mobilising reserves~100,000 initialMobilisation ordered immediately. The speed surprised Moscow. Tanks~800-900T-64BV/BM primary. Some T-72, T-80. Older but crews knew every bolt. IFVs / APCs~2,500+BMP-1, BMP-2, BTR-80. Soviet legacy fleet. Adequate for the mission. Artillery~1,000-1,2002S1, 2S3, 2S19, D-30 towed. No Western systems yet. Not one HIMARS. Not one Caesar. Fixed-wing combat aircraft~56 combat-capableSu-27, MiG-29, Su-25, Su-24. Aging. Outnumbered badly. Still showed up on Day One. Combat helicopters~50-60Mi-24, Mi-8. Limited numbers. Active brigades~33Plus National Guard, Border Guard, Territorial Defence standing up in real time. Western heavy weaponsZeroNot one Bradley. Not one Leopard 2. Not one HIMARS. Not one Western 155mm howitzer. Air defenceSubstantialS-300, Buk, Tor. Multiple overlapping layers. Better than Russia's planners had modelled. Will to fightNot assessed by RussiaThis is the variable that blew up the entire Russian plan. It was the only variable that mattered. That is the baseline. Russia stronger in almost every quantifiable category. Ukraine stronger in the one category that cannot be quantified until the shooting starts. My job in those days was to tell my readers which way this was going to go. I told them Russia had one chance and that window was days, not weeks. The moment it closed, the math started running the other direction. JUNE 2026 — WHAT THE LINES LOOK LIKE NOW Four years later. Same two armies. Completely different math. RUSSIA — June 2026 CategoryNumbersNotes Troops in theatre~700,000Up from 190,000 in 2022. These are not the same soldiers. The professionals are mostly dead or permanently wounded. What fills those 700,000 slots is mobilised men, convicts offered freedom for six months at the front, and teenagers from villages that have never had a choice about anything. KIA — confirmed dead~1,300,000+Ukrainian General Staff reporting plus Western intelligence. Former CIA Director Burns estimated 1.1 million casualties in January 2026. Russia has lost more men killed in four years than the United States lost in all of World War Two. Daily loss rate~1,200-1,500/dayRun the math. A Russian battalion fields 600-800 men. At 1,500 casualties a day that is two battalions every single day. A brigade runs 3,000-5,000 men — Russia is losing a brigade's worth of casualties every two to three days. Every week, two brigades. Every month, eight brigades. The television analysts who called this the second army in the world should explain publicly how the second army in the world loses two battalions a day for four consecutive years and has not won. Tanks — working frontline~1,500-2,000 estimatedThis is where Western analysis keeps going wrong. Not every tank Russia claims is working. Many analysts now believe Ukraine fields more operational tanks than Russia. The gap between claimed and functional is measured in corruption, deferred maintenance, and thirty years of Ukrainian winters sitting in open fields. Tank storage — T-90Zero serviceableCompletely exhausted from storage. New T-90M production is the only source. Cannot meet demand. Tank storage — all types~2,000-2,500 total hullsBut the vast majority are non-functional. OSINT analyst Jompy found approximately 32 tanks in decent condition at major storage bases in late 2025. Thirty-two. Down from 7,300 in 2021. What remains is T-62, T-55, stripped hulls, and rust. Some vehicle categories — MT-LB — are completely depleted. IFVs / APCs — working~1,500-2,000 estimatedNot the number on paper. The number that starts and shoots. BMP-class storage reserves have fallen from 7,700 to approximately 2,579. BMD airborne vehicle reserves are at 166. Most of what remains in storage is non-functional. Russia is fielding museum pieces. Artillery pieces lost~27,000+ confirmedFrom a pre-war inventory of ~35,000. Barrel production is now the single hardest constraint — Russia cannot manufacture artillery barrels fast enough to replace losses. Fixed-wing lost~372 confirmedProduction and pilot training cannot match attrition. Experienced crews are gone. New pilots rushed through months of training instead of years. Combat helicopters lost~335 confirmedKa-52 production slowed. The pilots who knew nap-of-the-earth in contested airspace are mostly dead or grounded. Monthly armor production~200-250 vehicles/monthNew-build plus refurbished storage pull combined. Not enough to replace losses running at 40+ tanks and 80+ IFVs per month. Ammunition supplyExternally supplementedNorth Korea supplying artillery rounds because Russian factories cannot keep up. Iran supplying Shahed drones because Russian production cannot keep up. This is what running out of industrial capacity looks like — you start buying from your clients. NCO corpsFunctionally destroyedThe professional sergeant corps that held Soviet-doctrine armies together is gone. Replacements are men promoted after weeks of training, not years. The institutional knowledge that turns equipment into combat power is bleeding out and not being replaced. RecruitmentFailingIncentive packages have tripled. Bonuses, debt forgiveness, mortgage relief. Men are hiding from military commissions. Rural Russia is scraped bare. Draft-age men flee to Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Georgia. The pool is thinning and everyone knows it. UKRAINE — June 2026 CategoryNumbersNotes Active military~880,000-1,000,000Full mobilisation. Every one of them has been at war longer than the United States' entire involvement in World War Two. Tanks — operational~2,500-3,000+T-64 backbone plus Leopard 2, Abrams, Challenger 2, PT-91, M-84A4, T-80 captured, T-72 donated, T-62 and T-90 captured from Russia. The most diverse operational tank fleet in the history of armoured warfare. Western IFVs~1,200+Bradley, Marder, CV90, Stryker, Rosomak, BVP M-80. KF41 Lynx initial deliveries begun. Soviet IFVs~3,000+BMP-1/2/3, BTR-80/82A continuously replenished from Russian battlefield losses. Every Russian vehicle destroyed or abandoned is a potential Ukrainian asset. Western artillery — 155mm~1,800+Caesar, PzH 2000, Krab, M109, Archer, AS-90, Zuzana 2, RCH 155. Plus Bohdana domestic production at 40/month — 345+ delivered. HIMARS / MLRS~100+High-precision long-range fires. Every Russian logistics hub, command post, and ammunition depot within 80km is a target. F-16AM/BM~30-35 physical in-countryCoalition commitment exceeds 85 aircraft total. Deliveries from Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Belgium continuing in stages as pilots qualify. Remainder staged in Poland and Romania as operational reserve. Mirage 2000-5F~3-4 physical in-countryFirst deliveries February 2025. One lost to equipment failure July 2025. French-trained pilots. Achieving 98% intercept rate against Russian cruise missiles and drones. Operating with SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow and AASM Hammer precision munitions. JAS-39 Gripen C/DFirst just arriving — 202616 C/D donated by Sweden announced May 2026. Pilot training in Sweden underway. Initial aircraft arriving as pilots complete qualification. Adds NATO-standard radar and weapons compatibility. Air defenceStrongest in EuropePatriot, NASAMS, SAMP/T, Gepard, Stinger, legacy S-300/Buk/Tor. Multiple overlapping layers. Ukraine is writing the textbook on integrated air defence that NATO is studying. Drone capabilityWorld-leadingFPV production exceeding 100,000/month by late 2025. Dedicated drone brigades. Long-range strike drones hitting targets 1,500km inside Russia. Ukraine is writing the doctrine that every NATO army is trying to replicate. Domestic defence productionScaling fastBohdana SPH 40/month. Drone production industrial-scale. MAC HUB Owl MRAP at full operational capability. Skif APC in testing. Ukrainian electronic warfare systems being adopted by NATO as reference designs. Brigades — active~120+Including new assault brigades, drone brigades, electronic warfare brigades. New formations standing up as Russian ones disintegrate. MoraleHighThey are fighting for their country. That has not changed. It will not change. Here is what that comparison tells you. Russia has more bodies in the field than it did in 2022. It is losing them at a rate it cannot sustain from a population that is already shrinking. Ukraine has fewer soldiers than Russia but better soldiers than Russia had four years ago. It has more capable weapons than it has ever had. It is producing its own artillery at forty a month. It is killing more Russian armour every month than Russia can produce from new construction. The lines crossed sometime in 2023. They have been moving in the same direction ever since. 2027 — WHERE THE MATH GOES This is not prediction. This is arithmetic. RUSSIA — 2027 Trajectory The stored armor problem is the one that should keep Russian planners awake at night. As of late 2025 OSINT satellite analysis found approximately 32 tanks in decent condition at major Russian storage bases. Thirty-two. The rest are stripped hulls, T-55s that belong in museums, T-62s with no spare parts, and rusted frames that would require more work to restore than it would take to build a new tank. The usable reserve that Russia thought was inexhaustible — the 7,300 tanks that looked so formidable in 2021 — is gone. What is left is scrap with track shoes. CategoryNumbersNotes Stored armor — tanksNear zero serviceable by mid-2027Depleted from 7,300 to ~2,000 total hulls by late 2025, the vast majority non-functional. At current draw-down rates serviceable reserves are exhausted by mid-to-late 2027. What Russia pulls out next will be T-55s that were old when the Wall fell. New tank production~300-350/yearUralvagonzavod maximum capacity. Mostly T-90M and refurbished T-72B3M. Not enough to replace losses running at 500+ per month. The production line cannot close the gap. IFV / APC storageFunctionally goneBMP reserves at ~2,579 from a pre-war 7,700. BMD reserves at 166. At current consumption rates there is nothing left to pull. Russia is beyond the point where storage rescues frontline losses. Recruits per monthDecliningIncentive packages have tripled and recruitment is still falling short. Rural Russia is emptied. Men flee across borders. The north Caucasus formations burn faster than they refill. The demographic wall is arriving. Professional soldiersEffectively goneThe pre-war professional NCO corps is dead, wounded, or burned out. What is being fielded is barely trained in three to six months. An army runs on its sergeants. Russia's sergeants are gone. Artillery barrel productionBottlenecked indefinitelyIdentified by military analysts as the single hardest-to-replace consumable. Russia cannot make barrels fast enough to replace losses. This constraint does not resolve by 2027. Air force — pilot qualityDegradingModern aircraft losses cannot be replaced at current production rates. Competent fighter pilots require years to train. Russia is flying aircraft at the edge of the envelope with pilots who are not ready for it. Financial sustainabilityUnder severe stressDefence budget exceeding 40% of federal expenditure. Oil revenues under price cap pressure. North Korea supplying shells. Iran supplying drones. China supplying machine tools. Russia is running a wartime economy with a sanctions-constrained industrial base. Glide bomb advantageErodingUkraine's growing F-16 fleet and air defence improvements are forcing Russian aircraft to longer stand-off ranges. The glide bomb that has been Russia's primary tactical edge is becoming less accurate as the launch envelope shrinks. UKRAINE — 2027 Trajectory CategoryNumbersNotes Mirage 2000 fleet — confirmed~20 in-country by end 2026French Air Force Rafale transition displacing Mirage 2000-5F airframes toward Ukraine. Currently 3-4 physical in-country, 6 total delivered with one lost. France has pledged to bring total to ~20. Each one is achieving 98% intercept rates against Russian missiles and drones. Twenty is a meaningful air defence contribution. Mirage 2000 fleet — potential20-50 total possibleFrance is actively pressing Greece to transfer its entire Mirage fleet: 24 Mirage 2000-5 plus 19 older Mirage 2000 EGM/BGM — 43 aircraft total. Greek maintenance contract expires 2027, giving Athens a deadline. If Greece accepts the Rafale swap deal, Ukraine could receive up to 50 Mirage 2000 airframes. Not all will be combat-ready, but 20-30 functional aircraft would transform Ukraine's air intercept capability. JAS-39 Gripen C/D16 donated — first arriving 2026Sweden announced the donation of 16 Gripen C/D alongside the purchase contract for 20 Gripen E/F. Pilot training in Sweden underway. First aircraft arriving as pilots qualify. NATO-standard avionics, weapons, and data links. Adds significant interoperability with NATO air operations. JAS-39 Gripen E/F20 ordered — delivery from 2027Ukraine signed the purchase agreement in May 2026, funded by €2.5 billion from the EU Ukraine Support Loan. The Gripen E/F is a modern 4th-generation fighter with AESA radar, electronic warfare suite, and full NATO weapons compatibility. Deliveries beginning 2027. Combined with C/D donation: 36 Gripen airframes total. Total Western fighter fleet — 2027100-120+ aircraftF-16 (85+ coalition commitment completing), Mirage 2000 (20-50 depending on Greek deal), JAS-39 Gripen (36 C/D + E/F combined). Ukraine will have more modern Western combat aircraft than many NATO members. And pilots who have been flying combat missions for three years. KF41 LynxSerial deliveries ongoingContract signed December 2025. Initial 5 delivered early 2026. Up to 200 planned by 2028. The most capable IFV in the world. Ukrainian crews are the first combat operators. Every NATO army considering the Lynx is watching Ukraine. Bohdana production40+/month and scaling345+ delivered as of mid-2025. Domestic 155mm production at $2.5M per system — a fraction of Western equivalents. Ukraine is the only nation in the world scaling domestic howitzer production while under active artillery attack. Drone productionIndustrial scaleHundreds of thousands of FPVs per month. Long-range strike drones hitting targets throughout Russia. Ukraine has become the world's most experienced military in drone warfare doctrine, production, and employment. NATO is learning from Ukraine, not the other way around. Combat experienceIrreplaceableThe officers and NCOs who started this war as lieutenants and sergeants are now captains and colonels. Four years of peer-competitor combat experience at every level of command. No training exercise replicates this. No NATO army has it. Ukraine has it entirely. Domestic defence industrySelf-sustaining trajectoryBohdana. BTR-3. BTR-4. MAC HUB Owl. Skif APC. Ukrainian missiles. Ukrainian EW systems. The dependency on foreign supply chains is systematically reducing. Each domestic system produced is one less diplomatic negotiation required. THE BOTTOM LINE In February 2022, Russia had one chance. Roll fast, collapse the Ukrainian government, install a puppet, and be home before anyone could stop them. The blood they moved forward told me they were not going home quickly. Everything else I told my readers was downstream from that one fact. They did not collapse Ukraine in seventy-two hours. From that moment, the clock started running against them, not for them. Four years later, Russia has a larger army on paper and less combat power in reality than it started with. It is fielding museum pieces alongside its front-line formations. It is paying men's debts to get them to sign contracts they would not otherwise sign. It is buying ammunition from North Korea because its own factories cannot keep up. It is buying drones from Iran because it cannot build them fast enough. Its tank storage — the vast reserve that looked so formidable in 2021 — is down to thirty-two serviceable hulls at its major bases. Thirty-two tanks in decent condition. That is not an army's reserve. That is a parking lot. Ukraine in 2027 will have more Western armour than it had in 2026. A better air defence network than it had in 2025. Between 100 and 120 modern Western combat aircraft where it had 56 aging Soviet jets in 2022. An artillery industry of its own that produced nothing four years ago. A drone capability that every NATO army is studying and trying to replicate. And a generation of combat veterans who have been at war for four years and forgotten more about peer-competitor warfare than any Western military academy has taught in the last thirty years. The lines crossed. They keep crossing. I am not going to tell you exactly how this ends. I am going to tell you which direction the math is pointing, because that is what I was trained to do. The math points one way.