The U.S. has always known that Russia is an empire and that, sooner or later, it would begin to invade Ukraine and other countries. This is not speculation or a conspiracy theory. It is based on their own documents.
In August 2025, the National Security Archive successfully sued the U.S. government to declassify the transcripts of conversations between Bush and Putin, which had been classified for two decades. The release began in late December. Add to that Ambassador Burns’s cable, released by WikiLeaks, and his letter to Secretary of State Rice — and we get the full picture: Washington heard everything, understood everything, and deliberately played along. Let’s go through the timeline.
Ljubljana, June 16, 2001. Bush’s first meeting with Putin. Putin immediately explains his worldview to the new U.S. president:
“What really happened? Soviet good will changed the world, voluntarily. And Russians gave up thousands of square kilometers of territory, voluntarily. Unheard of. Ukraine, part of Russia for centuries, given away. Kazakhstan, given away. The Caucasus, too. Hard to imagine, and done by party bosses.”
Twenty-five years ago. At their very first meeting — and Putin calls Ukraine “given away” Russian territory. He makes no secret of it. And immediately complains:
“But we feel left out of NATO. If Russia is not part of this, of course it feels left out. Why is NATO enlargement needed? In 1954, the Soviet Union applied to join NATO. I have the document.”
“But the real question is how we associate Russia with the rest of the civilized world. The fact is that NATO is enlarging and we have nothing to say about it.”
And now America’s response. After this very meeting, Bush addressed the press and delivered his legendary statement:
“I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy… I was able to get a sense of his soul.”
This man had just told him that Ukraine was “rightfully” Russian territory. A soul, you’ve got to admit.
Kananaskis, June 27, 2002. Bush and Putin discuss Georgia. Here’s the dialogue:
Bush: “Georgia — I know you don't think Georgians can do the job. They are petrified of joint operations.”
Putin: “We will not insist.”
Bush: “They need to go get the killers.”
Putin: “They won't.”
Putin continues: “We will not make any movement on their territory. But if the activities force the terrorists to go to our territory, we will not wait. We will hit them in Georgia. I have issued an order. We are deploying troops to block the border.”
Bush: “We need to develop a plan. One that you know about. We will develop jointly. A plan that will tell the Georgians what to do.”
Putin: “They will not fight, they are linked in drug trafficking.”
Bush: “Let's call Shevardnadze's bluff.”
Read that again. The U.S. president and the Russian dictator are jointly devising a plan “that will tell the Georgians what to do,” discussing Russian strikes on the territory of a sovereign state, and mocking its president behind its back. According to the Archive’s own assessment, Bush expressed “full understanding” of possible Russian strikes on Pankisi. Six years later, the Russian army would invade Georgia.
February 2008. U.S. Ambassador to Moscow William Burns sends a cable to Washington with a title that says it all: “Nyet Means Nyet.” The embassy reports:
“Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene.”
The Russian Foreign Ministry openly threatens: "A a radical new expansion of NATO may bring about a serious political-military shift that will inevitably affect the security interests of Russia" and that Moscow would "have to take appropriate measures."
And on February 8, Burns wrote personally to Rice:
“The next couple months will be among the most consequential in recent US-Russian relations. We face three potential trainwrecks: Kosovo, MAP for Ukraine/Georgia, and missile defense. But it's equally hard to overstate the strategic consequences of a premature MAP offer, especially to Ukraine.”
“Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite. Not just Putin.”
In other words, Washington knew for certain: Moscow considers Ukraine its property and is ready to use force. What conclusion did they draw? Not to restrain the empire. Not to arm potential victims. And not to provoke the Kremlin.
March 2008, a phone call ahead of the Bucharest summit. Bush asks Putin to be a “gentleman” in his remarks at the summit — so that he can come to Sochi for a visit afterward without any trouble. The U.S. president asks the dictator to behave politely because he has a visit planned. How sweet.
Bucharest, April 2–4, 2008. Ukraine and Georgia are denied MAP status. Instead of an action plan — a vague formula: “you will become members someday” — with no date, no mechanism, and no commitments. The Kremlin’s red lines proved more important than the security of two free nations.
Sochi, April 6, 2008. Two days after the summit, Bush is already visiting Putin. And he hears:
“Now I'd like to repeat what I said to Condi and Gates in Moscow on NATO enlargement. It won't be new to you, and I don't expect a response; I just .want to,say it out loud. I'd like to emphasize accession to NATO of a country like Ukraine will create for the long-term a field of conflict for you and us, long-term confrontation.”
Bush: “Why?”
Putin: “Seventeen million Russians live in Ukraine a third of the population. Ukraine is a very complex state. This is not a nation built in a natural manner. It's an artificial country created back in Soviet times. Following World War II Ukraine obtained territory from Poland, Romania and Hungary that's pretty much all of western Ukraine. In the 1920s and 1930s Ukraine obtained territory from Russia -- that's the eastern part of the country. In 1956, the Crimean peninsula was transferred to Ukraine.”
A complete imperial catalog of Ukrainian territory — right in front of the U.S. president. Crimea is mentioned by name, six years before the annexation. Putin, however, as always, got the year wrong — it was actually 1954. And note this: it was precisely these narratives about an “artificially created country” that became the driving force behind the propaganda during the full-scale invasion. It is also important that the dialogue explicitly states: Putin is “repeating what he told Condi and Gates in Moscow.” In other words, the entire top echelon of the U.S. government received this message personally. It gets even more explicit:
“Relying on the anti NATO forces in Ukraine, Russia would be working on stripping NATO of the possibility of enlarging. Russia would be creating problems there all the time.”
“And given the divergent views of areas of the population on NATO membership, the country could just split apart.”
This isn’t analysis. It’s a plan, voiced aloud. Regarding Georgia — they don’t even try to hide it:
“Now with Georgia, they believe with the shield of NATO they can restore their territorial integrity. Is this the right way to go, to spread NATO's military umbrella and let them start military operations in Ankhazia and South Ossetia? Guerilla warfare will start there as in Afghanistan. Will NATO go to war there? Of course not. The people in Georgia should be forced· to resolve their internal problems by other means. They will do it if forced to.”
“Will NATO go to war there? Of course not.” Putin already knew the value of Western guarantees back then. “Force them” — four months before the invasion. He is literally announcing the war to the U.S. president in person. And to complete the picture — his own remark about Chechen militants in Georgia:
“They played soccer with the heads of Georgians.”
And now — Bush’s reaction to everything he heard:
“One of the things I admire about you is you weren't afraid to say it to NATO. That's very admirabie. People listened carefully and had no doubt about your position. It was a good performance.”
The U.S. president had just heard that Ukraine was an “artificial country,” that Russia would “constantly create problems there,” and that Georgia would be “forced” to comply. And he responded with admiration. Four months later, Russian tanks were in Georgia. Six years later — the “little green men” were in Crimea.
Fourteen years later — a full-scale invasion.
Now, about the present. When Washington freezes aid to Kyiv, puts sanctions on hold, sends envoys to Moscow, and pressures us, demanding “compromises” involving the surrender of territories — this is not Trump’s policy. This is a consistent, twenty-five-year-long defense of the Kremlin’s interests. In 2001, Putin was paid a compliment about his character. In 2002, a plan for Georgia was drafted jointly with him. In 2008, Ukraine’s door to NATO was shut, and his threats were called a “good performance.” In 2026, we’re being asked to pay with territory for yet another “settlement.” One line. One pattern. The only difference is that before, this was whispered in Sochi, while Trump says it into a microphone.
The conclusion is simple. For twenty-five years, America chose “not to provoke Moscow” — and ended up with the biggest war in Europe since 1945. Concessions to an empire do not prevent wars — they merely set a date for them.